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LAW AND THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY
THURGOOD MARSHALL*
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the School
of Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in 1949, to honor the
memory of a well-loved alumnus and faculty member whose connection with
and service to the school extended over the period 1898-1947. This nineteenth
annual lecture was delivered March 8, 1967.
I have defined my subject as "Law and the Quest for Equality." Actually
the subject involves several themes: the synergy of law and social patterns;
the promotion of reform through, and by means of, existing legal means
and doctrine; and the changing role of a lawyer in society. I hope these
themes become apparent as I proceed.
I shall begin by giving a brief exegesis of the School Segregation Cases.' I
do not propose to tell of every legal recognition of equality or of every lapse
or legitimization of inequality from Dred Scott' to the school cases; the
story has been told elsewhere and quite well.3 But it is necessary for the de-
velopment of my subject and themes to discuss some of these cases.
Dred Scott sued Sandford, the executor of the estate of his former master,
for damages for an assault and battery that probably never occurred; the
suit was filed in a Missouri federal court in 1853. Sandford was a citizen
of New York; Scott alleged that he was a citizen of Missouri, having
been taken to the free state of Illinois and to territory in which slavery
had been prohibited by the Missouri Compromise. The jurisdiction of
the court was thus asserted to exist under the diversity clause. When
* Solicitor General of the United States.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
3. See J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW (1959); R. HARRIS, THE
QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960) (from which, obviously enough, I in part borrowed my
title); L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO (1966).
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the case was finally decided by the Supreme Court, however, Scott-
probably the person least affected by the decision-found that he could
not be a "citizen" of a state within Article III of the Federal Constitution,
and that, in any event, he was not free by his having lived in free territory
because Congress had no power to deprive slave owners of "property" rights
by prohibiting slavery in certain territory. It had been hoped-indeed ex-
pected-that the Supreme Court's ruling would settle much controversy,
including that of the status of the vast territory, and the states to arise out of
it, west of the Mississippi not covered by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which had prohibited slavery and had been passed prior to the adoption
of the Constitution. As we now know, and as was realized shortly after the
decision, Dred Scott, rather than settling controversy, added to it.
After much travail and a costly war, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments were adopted, each of which contained an innovative
provision giving Congress the power to enforce them "by appropriate legis-
lation." And the Reconstruction Congresses exercised that power in various
civil rights legislation. The Supreme Court, however, struck down some of
those provisions in the Civil Rights Cases' in 1883, which tolled the death-
knell for such legislation; and, as it turned out, Congress did not use the
power specifically granted to it for the next eighty-odd years. Of course,
one can hardly place all the responsibility for the Civil Rights Cases on the
Court. By the time the Court had declared the Civil Rights Act of 1876
unconstitutional, the Act had already fallen into desuetude. Thereafter,
and perhaps partially as a result of the reasoning of Chief Justice Taney in
Dred Scott,5 the fourteenth amendment became not an effective shield for
human rights, as it had been intended, but rather a mechanism by which
corporations took on human traits and enjoyed the protections of what
became known as substantive due process.
The last of this unfortunate trilogy is Plessy v. Ferguson,' which, like
Dred Scott, was largely a trumped-up case. The Supreme Court upheld a
state statute prescribing the racial separation of railroad passengers within
the state; it reasoned that establishing "separate but equal" facilities did
not violate the fourteenth amendment. In so upholding the enforced sep-
aration of those who were declared by that amendment, as "citizens of the
United States and the State wherein they reside," to be entitled to the "equal
protection of the laws," the Court legitimized and gave impetus to the myr-
iad laws and customs described as---
4. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1857); see 2 L. POLLAX,
THE CONSTrrUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 212 (1966).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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. . . a pervasive, official system of segregation which carries from
cradle to gave... requir[ing] the Negro to begin life in a segregated
neighborhood, attending separate schools, using segregated parks,
playgrounds, swimming pools, which later kept him apart at work, at
play, at worship, even at court and while going from one place to
another, which confined him in segregated hospitals, and prisons, and
finally relegated him to a separate burial place.7
Thus, as Dean Pollak has said, the Court in Plessy "gave constitutional mo-
mentum to the growth of an entire way of life: the racially divided pattern
known as Jim Crow.""
Justice Harlan correctly prophesied in his dissent in Plessy that the de-
cision would, "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision ...
in the Dred Scott Case."9 But Plessy marks the nadir of constitutional pro-
tection for minorities.
From this point, the story changes. To be sure, there had been some
earlier indication of hope for the quest for equality through the courts, most
notably the decisions in the Strauder0 case in 1880, which in effect held
unconstitutional a state statute prescribing that only white males could
serve on a jury, and in Yick Wo v. Hopkins" in 1886, which condemned
administrative discrimination against Chinese as a class. Nevertheless, the
story, despite the numerous legal victories from this point onward, does not
follow an undeviating plot. Like any interesting story, it has its ups and
downs.
One of the first cases in which a then fledgling organization, the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, participated was
Guinn v. United States" in 1915, in which the "grandfather" restrictions on
voting were struck down. Thereafter, the NAACP helped to have declared
unconstitutional racially restrictive zoning ordinances," state laws barring
Negroes from primary elections,'" and the mob-dominated trial of a Negro."
In these and other cases in which the NAACP participated no over-all
litigation strategy was developed or followed.
In the early 1930's, however, there was a change. Gratified by the ad hoc
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 62-63, Griffin v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 130 (1963) (footnotes, citing statutes, omitted).
8. See 2 L. POLLAK, supra note 5, at 256. See generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
9. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
10. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
11. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
12. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
13. Buchanan v. Waley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
14. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
15. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
victories but dissatisfied in its quest for equality, the organization decided
that it would press on every possible front for the elimination of inequality
and discrimination. The means selected was through use of the courts,"
partially because other avenues of redress appeared to be closed, and par-
tialy because of the deep and abiding faith the planners had in the rule of
law, and the efficacy and feasibility of instigating social reform through
reliance upon the Constitution-which after all was designed to insure the
protection of the basic values of our society. I should not, however, stress
too greatly any over-all plan other than the decision to proceed through
the courts, for that would be misleading.
In any event, realization of the quest proceeded, not without occasional
setbacks to be sure, but it proceeded. The Supreme Court continued to
rule against discrimination in the selection of grand and petit jurors and, in
various ways, to insure the fairness of criminal proceedings against Negroes.
It struck down abhorrent police practices, such as the beating of Negroes
suspected of crime in order to obtain confessions. As Chief Justice Hughes
said in the first of the coerced confession cases, Brown v. Mississippi": "The
rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."
That case, incidentally, was argued for the petitioners on behalf of the
NAACP by a former governor of the state of Mississippi.
In the famous Scottsboro" cases-in which a group of Negro boys were
charged with raping a white woman-the Court first ruled that the trials
were unfair because the defendants did not have the effective assistance of
counsel, and later, after several of the boys had been retried, that the trials
were unfair because of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of
juries: no witness could recall when a Negro sat on a jury; in the old
common law phrase, man's mind runneth not to the contrary.
Thereafter, rulings against discriminatory practices were reached in wide
aspects of life. In a series of decisions the Court helped to eliminate discrim-
inatory disenfranchisement of Negroes by looking through the ingenious
white primary, 9 gerrymandering,"0 and other such schemes. As Justice
Frankfurter said: the Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination."'" Similarly, the Court struck down
16. See J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 34-39; L. MILLER, supra note 3, at 259-62.
17. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936). See also, e.g., Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
18. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941).
20. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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peonage laws,22 and, under the aegis of the federal labor laws, discriminatory
union practices, 3 while at the same time protecting the right to protest and
demonstrate against discrimination in employment.24
In the area of discrimination in public accommodations, the Court ruled
against the maintenance of separate dining cars under the Interstate Com-
merce Act,25 in a case in which the United States through the Solicitor Gen-
eral, though nominally a defendant, supported the petitioner against the
ICC. And the Court upheld state laws proscribing discrimination in trans-
portation.2
The enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was declared to be
violative of the fourteenth amendment.27 And in a series of rulings 8 in-
volving discrimination in higher education, the Court seriously undermined
the rationale of the Plessy case, at least with respect to public education. In
one of the cases the Court said not that the Negro student having been
admitted to the state school might receive separate but equal treatment,
but rather that he "must receive the same treatment at the hands of the
state as students of other races." 9
I should note also that by this time, the early 1950's, many states had
undertaken to eliminate racial discrimination, and that the executive branch
of the federal government had not only supported the petitioners in several
of the cases, but had affirmatively sought to eliminate discrimination in the
services, in governmental employment, and in the insurability of homes in
mixed neighborhoods through the FHA. I mention this because it is
important to realize the impetus for change stimulated by, among other
things, the Court decisions I have mentioned.
Finally in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, the school segregation
cases, was decided. I had the privilege of arguing the cases in the Supreme
21. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
22. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
23. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
24. See, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
25. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
26. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
27. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
28. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada., 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
29. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (emphasis
added).
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Court-actually of arguing them twice, since they had been set for reargu-
ment from the previous term. Because of my participation, I might per-
haps overestimate Brown's importance, though I doubt it.
My friend Loren Miller prefaces the chapter on the Brown case in his
recent book with an excerpt from a spiritual:
There's a better day a' comin'
Fare thee well, fare thee well,
In that great gettin' up morning
Fare thee well, fare thee well."
and refers to May 17, 1954-opinion day in Brown-as "That Great Get-
tin' Up Morning." Similarly, Dean Pollak of the Yale Law School has said
that the decision in the School Segregation Cases was, with the exception
of the wars, "the single most important governmental act of any kind since
the Emancipation Proclamation."'" It doesn't matter for my purposes here
if you do not fully share that view; surely, though, all will acknowledge the
importance of the decision. In holding segregated public education uncon-
stitutional, the Court eliminated one of the two primary pillars of the caste
system (the other being disenfranchisement). The decision was not an easy
one to reach, nor did it prove easy to enforce. Several states and many com-
munities were quite recalcitrant and are only now coming to accept the
decision.
Of course, the story of the quest for equality does not end with the
School Segregation Cases. Indeed, it branches out in several directions,
most notably to legislation: the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964,
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Since it is a quest, the quest for equality
is always an ongoing search, as our ideas and hopes are transmuted into
reality. As President Johnson said recently at Howard University's centen-
nial celebration:
For the work that lies ahead is demanding, and involves far too many
lives in urgent need of help, to be parceled out by race. Tomorrow's
problems... will not be divided into "Negro problems" and "white
problems." There will be only human problems, and more than
enough to go around. 2
I should also mention at this point that for many the civil liberties prob-
lems today are not so much of active discrimination, but rather of lack of
certain opportunities. Hence, the emphasis has shifted toward the seeking
of affirmative action, the exhortation to legislatures to act. I am sure that
30. L. MILLER, supra note 3, at 347.
31. 2 L. POLLAK, supra note 5, at 266.
32. 3 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESMENTIAL DOCUMENTS 357 (1967).
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all recognize that if a statute is patently unconstitutional, it can be chal-
lenged in the courts. But what if the claim relates to some lack of oppor-
tunity, a denial not of access to facilities, but rather of the refusal to take
needed affirmative action? As we have seen, much of this kind of protest
cannot effectively be channeled. Indeed, some of the protest cannot even
be said to be directed at particular goals. Of course, civil disobedience,
which is the theoretical underpinning of protest movements, is also a force
for social change and progress. It is often necessary, in order to establish
the need for action, to obtain and use what Professor Harry Kalven has
called, in his interesting analysis of the sit-in cases, the "public forum."33
But he who advocates civil disobedience must be aware of its import:
[I]t goes counter to the general obligation to obey the law and almost
always there are serious dangers of undesirable consequences for others.
There is, therefore, a particular obligation to act conscientiously. ... 34
The NAACP participated in most of the decisions I have discussed.
Indeed, it was so successful that several states began to attack it through
legislation, discriminatory application of old laws, or legislative investiga-
tion-seeking directly and indirectly to prevent or curtail its operation.
The attacks on each occasion were rebuffed only by action of the Supreme
Court."
As I have mentioned, the quest for equality by litigation in the courts, up
to the Supreme Court, and by the favorable decisions obtained is, I think,
testimony to support my themes: that law cannot only respond to social
change but can initiate it, and that lawyers, through their everyday work
in the courts, may become social reformers.
All of the cases I have discussed involved infringements upon the rights
of Negroes. Of course they involved more than the race of the particular
litigant, for as President Kennedy said, echoing the thoughts of others,
in a nationwide address on June 11, 1963, occasioned by the opposition
of a governor of a state to the court-ordered enrollment of two students
in a graduate school:
This nation ... was founded on the principle that all men are cre-
33. H. KALVEN, THE NEcRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 123-72 (1965). See also
M. KONVITZ, EXPANDING CML LIBERTIES 267-339 (1960).
34. Weingartner, Justifying Civil Disobedience, COLUM. U.F., Spring 1966, at 44.
35. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 16 (1961); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961);
NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
see H. KALVEN, supra note 33, at 65-121.
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ated equal, and that the rights of every man are diminished when
the rights of one man are threatened."
Moreover, these cases do not appear in Shepard's Citations with an asterisk
to limit their precedential value to race relations. They concern us as law-
yers, law professors, citizens, and government officials because the principles
they announce quite transcend the immediate controversy which occasioned
them. Thus, Powell v. Alabama," the first Scottsboro case, gave rise
to an important principle in the administration of justice announced finally
in Gideon v. Wainwright:38 the due process right to a fair trial includes
representation by counsel and the appointment thereof for the defendant
who cannot afford to retain counsel. The same is true, of course, of the
early coerced confession cases; they too have spawned many offspring.
In short, these decisions go far to prove the truth of Dean Pound's state-
ment that what he called "justice according to law"-
.. insures that the more valuable ultimate interests, social and indi-
vidual, will not be sacrificed to immediate interests which are more
obvious and pressing but of less real weight.3"
And the social reform inherent in the decisions was achieved by the efforts
of men, largely lawyers, who believed that through the rule of law change
could indeed be wrought. The Negro who was once enslaved by law be-
came emancipated by it, and is achieving equality through it. To be sure
law is often a response to social change; but as I think Brown v. Board
of Education" demonstrates, it also can change social patterns. Provided
it is adequately enforced, law can change things for the better; moreover,
it can change the hearts of men, for law has an educational function also.
Of what relevance is all of this to my second theme: the role of lawyers
in society? The lawyer has often been seen by minorities, including the poor,
as part of the oppressors in society. Landlords, loan sharks, businessmen
specializing in shady installment credit schemes-all are represented by
counsel on a fairly permanent basis. But who represents and speaks for
tenants, borrowers, and consumers? Many special interest goups have per-
manent associations with retained counsel who seek and sponsor advan-
tageous legislation. But who represents and speaks for the substantial seg-
ment of the populace that such legislation might disadvantage? Outside of
36. 1963 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES-JOHN F.
KENNEDY 468 (1964).
37. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
38. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. Pound, Justice According to Law, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 261 (1963).
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the political processes, I think the answer is clear. Lawyers have a duty in
addition to that of representing their clients; they have a duty to present the
public, to be social reformers in however small a way.
The cases I have mentioned show what can be done by private lawyers
through the courts. And the possibilities of social change and reform today
are far greater. The lawyer's image as solely the protector of vested interests
is changing.
For years the bar responded to the need for legal services for the poor
through legal aid, but even the most ardent supporters of the legal aid move-
ment never claimed that the needs of the poor were fully met. Now, we
have at hand the tools with which to provide those services in an organized
and more complete way. Of course I am referring to the Neighborhood
Legal Services concept within the Office of Economic Opportunity, ninety
per cent federally funded, organized legal services for the poor. Like any
reform scheme, however, the success of that program is directly related to
the quality of the people, especially the lawyers, who become active in it.
And like one of my themes, it involves the quest for equality, no longer
racial, but rather equality in access to justice.
Some may undoubtedly disagree with some of the recent changes
in social patterns and in the law. Well-considered dissent is, of course, an
intimate part of the process of society. But I am sure all agree that
the force of law-its capacity to initiate change and its flexibility to
accept and mold change-is a major force in society, a force which lawyers
are most often called upon to shape. From the early days in this country's
history, it has been the traditional task of lawyers to mediate between
principle and practice, between man's heritage and his hopes-that is the
message of Law and the Quest for Equality-and that task and message
we must never forget.
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